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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview 
of the tax compliance problem, to introduce the theory of 
deterrence, to provide a description of the purpose of the 
research, and to describe the organization of the remainder 
of the dissertation. 
Overview of the Problem 
of Tax Noncompliance 
Noncompliance with United States tax laws includes 
failure to file a tax return, underreporting of income, 
overstatement of deductions or exemptions, and failure to 
pay taxes due. Although noncompliance in some cases is 
inadvertant, this study focuses on overt noncompliance 
because overt noncompliance with U.S. tax laws is a severe 
and growing problem. Estimates of the loss in federal 
revenue due to such noncompliance were placed at $95.2 
billion for 1981 by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
[1983]. Voluntary compliance rates have been estimated to 
have dropped from 84 percent in 1973 to less than 81 percent 
in 1981. These estimates may be conservative, based on the 
1 
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estimates of federal revenue loss by Gutmann [1977, 1980], 
Feige [1979], and Tanzi [1982]. 
Gutmann estimated the underground cash economy to be 
$176 billion for 1976. This estimate constituted about 9.5 
percent of the total 1976 reported GNP. In 1980, Gutmann 
revised the earlier figures upward to $223 billion for 1976. 
The estimated tax loss associated with this activity was 
over $50 billion. 
Growth trends have been applied to the discrete evasion 
estimates of Gutmann, the IRS [1983], and others [Feige, 
1979; Tanzi, 1982]. The resulting approximations of current 
and potential future tax revenue lost through evasion are 
staggering. Point estimates for growth rate vary from study 
to study, but the consensus is that the current rate of 10 
to 15 percent is on the rise. Consensus places the estimate 
of the 1983 tax gap in excess of $100 billion. Predictions 
for 1985 are $120 billion [Friedrich, 1983]. 
If inroads can be made into eliminating the causes of 
the gap in revenue collections, that is, the amount of tax 
revenue lost through evasion, significant reductions in the 
much-discussed federal deficit could result in addition to 
realizing improvement in the overal 1 U.S. tax environment. 
Musgrave and Musgrave [1984, p. 225], elaborating on 
. . . 
the requirements for a good tax structure, stressed the 
importance of the criteria of equity and efficiency. When 
these criteria are not being effectively carried out, the 
entire economy suffers. Equity is diminished by the ability 
of taxpayers to evade paying taxes. Horizontal equity is 
violated by a taxpayer's ability to evade paying the taxes 
paid by a compliant taxpayer with similar income. Vertical 
equity is breached by the high income tax evader paying no 
more tax than a low income taxpayer. When the costs of 
compliance to taxpayers and of collection for the government 
are reduced in relation to the total tax revenue, efficiency 
is increased. More capital would remain available for 
private investment and the government would have more funds 
available for allocation. 
To accomplish these objectives, factors contributing to 
the tax compliance gap must be identified. The focus of 
research in the area of overt noncompliance should begin 
with identification of causal variables and then proceed 
toward an integration of those variables into a descriptive 
model of compliance/noncompliance. 
The IRS is trying to encourage compliance and provide 
an equitable base for the tax system. Part of the IRS's 
solution to the problem of noncompliance lies in the area of 
detection. 
declined. 
The frequency of audits in recent years has 
In 1976, 2.59% of all taxpayers were audited. 
1982 the rate had dropped to 1.55%, and in 1983 only 1.36% 
of al 1 taxpayers' returns were audited [IRS, 1983; Murray, 
By 
1984]. The trend is expected to continue, especially if the 
IRS budget cutbacks continue under the Reagan administration 
[Murray, 1984]. Increasing audit frequency would require a 
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larger staff and a substantial budgetary increase. Due to 
budget constraints, the IRS must use other methods to 
improve taxpayer compliance. 
Roscoe L. Egger, Jr. [1983J, a former Commissioner of 
the IRS, affirmed the Service's committment to closing the 
gap. Currently, the IRS is increasing use of computer 
technology as a detection tool [Adams, 1985]. Modern 
technology aids in matching reported earnings with other 
third party documentation. Detection of discrepancies in 
taxpayer reporting will permit collection of a greater 
portion of owed but unpaid taxes. Despite these 
technological efforts by the IRS, the tax gap appears to be 
widening. 
The current approach appears somewhat myopic. Efforts 
to improve detection of tax evasion could be supplemented by 
other methods of increasing the level of compliance. 
Development of such methods requires a clearer understanding 
of the factors influencing noncompliance behavior. Studies 
are needed on the noncompliance effect(s) of tax rates, 
sanctions, attitudes, etc. 
According to Jerome Kurtz [1977J, former Commissioner 
of the IRS, U.S. citizenry appear to perceive current 
penalties for underreporting income and overstating 
deductions on tax returns as very low. Kurtz noted that IRS 
penalties are not high enough to deter noncompliance, "If a 
person is an economic being and figures out the odds, then 
there is a very high incentive to cheat." In other words, a 
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person who can determine the probability of being caught 
coupled with a low penalty will calculate the expected 
amount of gain to be obtained through evasion to be greater 
than the expected amount of the loss from detection and 
penalties. Although criminal sentences of up to 5 years in 
prison and $100,000 fines are possible, criminal cases made 
up less than 1/10 of one percent of total IRS investigations 
and audits in 1981, which themselves made up less than two 
percent of total returns filed [Mansfield, 1983, p. 218]. 
Penalties for the majority of tax noncompliance are 
surprisingly small. Table I contains a listing of these 
penalties and their maximum levels. For example, the 
penalty for substantial underpayment [Internal Revenue Code 
Section 6661] amounts to only 10% of understated income, 
plus interest. This penalty became effective with the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [U.S. Cong~ess, 
1982l. During its first year, the IRS assessed only 149 
underpayment penalties under this provision. Other 
offenders of this law paid only the outstanding taxes owed 
plus compound interest computed for late payment. The 
general results of this type of sanction prompted one IRS 
official to say, "We're still the best place in town to 
borrow from for many people." [Murray, 1984]. 
Harry Mansfield, Senior Tax Attorney at Ropes and Gray 
in Boston, discussed the problem of noncompliance [1983, p. 
230]. He stated, " ... no one really knows much about the 
relative deterrent effect upon taxpayers of criminal 
5 
TABLE I 
MAJOR TAXPAYER PENALTIES 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code 
Type Section 
Criminal: 
Evasion 7201 
Failure 7203 
to pay or 
report 
False 7206(1) 
statement 
Civi 1: 
Fraud 6653(b) 
Negligence 6653(a) 
Delinquency 665t(a)(J) 
Delinquency 665l(a)(2) 
Valuation 6659 
over-
statement 
Substantial 6661 
Under-
state11ent 
Prmoting 6700 
abusive 
tax shelters 
Oeser i ption 
Willful attempt to 
evade or defeat a tax 
Willful failure to pay 
tax, file return, or 
keep records 
False return or 
statement 
Deficiency due to 
fraud 
Negligence or intentional 
disregard of rules 
Failure to file timely 
return 
Failure to pay tinely 
tax 
Valuation overstatement 
of property 
Nonexcused underpayment 
exceeding 1r1. of correct 
tax 
False statement about 
tax benefits, or 
valuation overstatement 
Source: Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
Pen a I ty 
Felony--fine of ~100,000; 
prison for 5 years 
Hisdemenor--fine of 
1251000; prison for 
1 year 
Felony--fine of $100 1000; 
prison for 3 years 
SOY. of deficiency, plus 
SOY. of related interest 
~!. of deficiency, plus 
50/. of related interest 
~!. per month 1 
up to 25Y. 
1/2 of 1/. per month, 
up to 25Y. 
Variable--lOY. to 30Y. 
of allocated tax 
deficiency 
lOY. of allocated 
tax deficiency 
Greater of i2,000 or 
20/. of actit,tity 
gross incme 
6 
sanctions, civil penalties, and interest charges ... we need 
that element of fear." Deterrence theory fits this idea. 
Deterrence Theory 
The deterrence proposition is that the perception of 
certain, swift, and severe sanctions will keep people from 
engaging in sanctionable behavior [Teevan, 1976J. 
Deterrence theory is a perceptual behavior theory based on a 
set of cues. These cues explain why individual persons 
conform to or deviate from norms, i.e. comply with or do not 
comply with a set of rules. A number of these cues or 
variables have been identified by theorists or researchers. 
The most important of these include: (1) sanction fear, (2) 
moral beliefs, <3> degree of integration of an individual 
into the social system, (4) extent of satisfaction with the 
social and political systems, (5) reinforcement value for 
the individual of various behaviors, (6) perceptions of the 
relative advantage or deprivation of one's life 
circumstances, and <7> various psychological conditions 
[Tittle and Logan, 1973; Tittle, 1976]. 
Through the middle 1970s, the most popular focus of 
researchers had been on motivational components, while 
interest in constraint as a possible factor toward achieving 
compliance had been minimal [Goode, 1972; Arvey and 
Ivancevich, 1980]. In fact, many researchers have been 
highly skeptical that sanction threats, or even sanctions, 
induce complying behavior [Salem and Bowers, 1970; Bowers 
7 
and Salem, 1971; Waldo and Chiricos, 19721. 
Much of the criticism of the sanction threat cue was 
due to the results of dichotomizing sanction threat into a 
cue that indicates the individual's probability of 
noncomplying behavior being detected and a cue which 
explains the nature and severity of the sanction <penalty). 
Evidence was presented to suggest that probability of 
detection has a deterrent effect on noncompliance, while the 
perceived severity of penalties does not [Waldo and 
Chiricos, 1972; Bailey and Lott, 1976; Silberman, 1976; 
Teevan, 1976; Meier and Johnson, 19771. 
Apparently, there is a strong interaction between 
probability of detection and severity of penalty. If the 
probability of detection is perceived high, the penalty 
magnitude can be relatively low, and noncompliance will be 
deterred. Thus, it has been presumed that if the 
probability of detection is low, the perceived penalty must 
be high to achieve the same level of deterrence, ceteris 
paribus [Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Scott and Grasmick, 
1981]. Many of the critics were focusing on an element of 
the second interactive proposition, i.e. the issue that a 
low (or zero> probability of detection will not deter a 
potential malefactor from noncompliance. But all of the 
cues and interactions influence an individual's perceptions 
of the consequences of noncomplying behavior [Saltzman et 
al., 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982; Paternoster et al., 19831. 
These consequences enter into an individual's decision on 
8 
whether to comply or not. If the balance between the 
results of various attitudinal behavior cues and the 
interactive sanction fear cues outweighs the gain to be 
derived from noncompliance, deterrence will be achieved. 
The necessary cues must be in place for noncomplying 
behavior to be deterred. 
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study was to determine 
whether relatively higher magnitudes of penalties have a 
greater deterrent on noncompliance, given a relatively low, 
constant perceived probability of detection. A laboratory 
experiment using college students as subjects self-grading 
and self-assessing exam scores following a set of rules was 
conducted to attempt to isolate the impact of the 
factor--magnitude of penalty--in the model of noncompliance. 
This study differs from those that have preceded it in 
several ways. In one way, the use of a laboratory 
experiment method is relatively new to deterrence studies. 
For example, Grasmick and Bryjak [1980] and Scott and 
Grasmick [1981] utilized subject-self-reporting, survey 
techniques. Also, the experimental task in this study was 
real, not hypothetical. Thus experimental validity was 
enhanced. The subjects were truly involved in the task due 
to an inherent reward structure, the course grade. 
Another difference from prior works is that this study 
utilized a sanction environment analagous to the sanction 
9 
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environment of income tax compliance. A low <non-zero> 
probability of detection existed. Much previous research in 
deterrence has focused on subjects confronted with a high 
certainty of apprehension [e.g. Grasmick and Bryjak, 19801. 
Also, Scott and Grasmick [19811 utilized zero probability of 
apprehension situations in addition to high certainty levels 
of apprehension. Although Jackson and Jones [19851 tested 
penalty magnitudes at low detection levels, their results 
were inconclusive. They suggested further investigation 
into the importance of penalties as sanction threats in an 
income tax compliance environment. 
To test the effects of an honor system on cheating, 
Canning [19561 and Ackerman [19711 used somewhat similar 
self-grading procedures as used in this study. Canning 
utilized a pre-test, post-test experimental design. 
Experimental variables were not intentionally manipulated by 
the researcher. His concern was with the change in the 
incidence of cheating after the implementation of an honor 
system at a university. Ackerman [19711 did not use a 
direct experimental method. He used a questionnaire asking 
students if they had cheated while self-grading 
examinations. In the present study, variables, such as 
stated penalty magnitudes, were intentionally manipulated 
within the experiment to study the change in compliance. 
Both Canning and Ackerman allowed the classroom 
instructors to conduct their respective experiments or 
collect the data. Some bias may have been present in their 
data due to the presence of a correspendent condition 
[Friedland, Thibaut, and Walker, 19731. This condition 
results when student-subjects perform or comply for their 
teachers. In the present study, a person separate from the 
instructors directed the experimental portion of the study 
in an attempt to eliminate some of the correspondent 
condition bias. 
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Two distinct phases of this study were conducted during 
two consecutive academic semesters. In Phase One all 
experimental subjects received the same low, constant 
probability of detection. Penalty magnitudes were varied to 
test their effect on noncompliance. Phase Two of the study 
was conducted during a semester subsequent to the conducting 
of Phase One. In Phase Two of this study, using the same 
general methodology, the interactive effect of relatively 
higher magnitudes of penalties and relatively higher 
probabilities of detection was observed on noncompliance. 
Results obtained from the use of the varied levels of the 
two sanction variables should enhance and provide further 
definition to the general theory of deterrence. 
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter II provides a review of the relevant tax 
compliance/noncompliance and behavioral experimentation 
literature. 
the study. 
Chapter III details the methodology employed in 
Chapter IV offers an analysis of the results of 
Phase One of the study, and Chapter V provides an analysis 
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of the results of Phase Two of the study. Chapter VI 
contains a summary and conclusions of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In recent years, a number of researchers have addressed 
the issue of the factors that influence noncompliance. Many 
varied research methods have been utilized. Some authors 
have explored the relationship between such factors as 
probability of detection, magnitude of penalties, economic 
factors, fairness, social acceptability, perceived 
government inefficiencies, demographics, and legal 
complexities. This literature review will present findings 
of compliance research categorized by the general research 
method. Results from analytical models will be described 
first. That section will be followed by a discussion of 
empirical studies of factors affecting noncompliance. The 
third and final section will describe results of behavioral 
studies. 
Analytical Models of Noncompliance 
The first attempt at characterizing the evasion 
(noncompliance) problem in a theoretical/analytical context 
was done by Allingham and Sandmo [1972]. The individual 
taxpayer is assumed to make decisions on compliance by 
13 
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maximizing his/her expected utility for personal disposable 
income plus gains. Two key relationships were developed: 
the dollar amount of tax evasion is inversely related (1) to 
the probability of detection, and <2> to the magnitude of 
penalties on owed but unpaid taxes. The analysis was 
extended to include social status as an argument of the von 
Naumann-Morgenstern utility function. If social standing 
has a positive utility to a taxpayer and is adversely 
affected by detection of evasion, tax evasion would tend to 
decrease due to the possible loss of social standing. This 
implies that social standing has a substitution effect for 
income. Extensions and refinements of the Allingham and 
Sandmo model have been produced by Kolm [1973], Srinivasan 
[1973], Yitzhaki [1974], and Witte and Woodbury [1985]. 
Models such as these allow researchers to examine the 
effect(s) of tax rates, probability of detection, and 
penalties, on amount of unreported income. In these models 
the utility function is assumed to be strictly concave, 
i.e. , U' > 0 and U" < 0. The individual is assumed to be 
risk averse. The measure of the degree of risk aversion is 
the Arrow-Pratt measure <R =- CU''/U'J). R is larger for 
more risk averse individuals and is often assumed to be a 
decreasing function of income. Therefore, an increase in 
the penalty rate or the probability of detection will 
increase declared income. The effect of an increase in the 
tax rate on declared income is ambiguous in this model. 
Kolm's note on the optimum evasion model [1973] uses 
Allingham and Sandmo's model from the government sector 
viewpoint. Allingham and Sandmo's model implies that the 
penalty rate and the probability of detection are 
substitutes for each other, and they assume a risk averse 
utility function. But Kolm notes that utility is separable 
in private and public goods. His results indicate that the 
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usual public good condition (i.e., the marginal rate of 
substitution between public and private goods equals the 
marginal rate of transformation) is modified to allow for 
the effects of tax rate on amount of reported income. In 
such a scenario the optimal tax rate depends on the tradeoff 
between public and private goods. 
Srinivasan's model [1973] indicates that the optimal 
level of enforcement will depend on how the probability of 
detection varies with the amount spent on detection and how 
government revenue <tax revenue plus penalties) changes with 
the probability of detection. Srinivasan found that evasion 
will decrease as the probability of detection increases. 
This finding is due to his model specification that the 
level of enforcement should be set higher if the probability 
of detection rises more rapidly with enforcement expenditure 
and if government revenue increases rapidly as the 
probability of detection rises. 
Yitzhaki's analysis (1974] shows that if a penaLty is 
imposed on the evaded tax <as is the case in the United 
States), there are no contradictory effects. That is, in 
Allingham and Sandmo's previously-mentioned model the 
assumption existed that the taxpayer should pay a fixed 
penalty rate on the undeclared income. This assumption 
leads to the conclusion that when the tax rate increases 
there will be two opposing effects, an income and a 
substitution effect. The substitution effect encourages 
underreporting because a higher tax rate makes it more 
profitable to underreport income. In contrast, the income 
effect discourages underreporting because a higher tax rate 
reduces net income, causing individuals to become more risk 
averse. In Yitzhaki's model there is no substitution 
effect. Only an income effect is present. Therefore, as 
the tax rate increases, underreported income decreases. 
The previous models fail to reflect actual tax 
structures. For example the models assume tax rates that 
are not progressive but are applied at a fixed rate to all 
income. Witte and Woodbury [1985] take a step forward in 
their model development. Their model reflects the tax laws 
16 
and tax administration policies of the United States Cduring 
the 1960s and 1970s). A progressive tax structure is 
assumed and the taxpayer is faced with three possible IRS 
actions--audit, civil penalty, and criminal sanction. Also, 
it is assumed that the penalty for noncompliance depends on 
the amount of tax underpayment and that the absolute value 
of the penalties increase with the extent of IRS action. 
The authors assumed, as have the previously-mentioned 
analyses, that the taxpayer is risk averse. 
17 
Witte and Woodbury empirically tested their model using 
data relating to 1969 tax returns that the IRS released for 
outside research during 1981. The data set contained such 
variables as audit rates, prosecution rates, seriousness of 
sentences imposed for conviction of criminal tax fraud, 
socio-economic, and demographic factors. The data were 
aggregated to the three-digit zip code. The research 
results indicated that for some taxpayer classes the 
probability of civil fraud penalty is negatively related to 
voluntary compliance. Additionally, the results indicated 
that the measure of probability of criminal sanctions is not 
significantly related to compliance. These findings are 
contrary to the model specification <i.e., increased 
penalties increase compliance) and to the general theory of 
deterrence. These results indicate that more research is 
necessary to validate deterrence theory in the context of 
United States tax law. 
Empirical Studies on Factors 
Affecting Noncompliance 
In an early empirical work Schwartz and Orleans [1967], 
with IRS cooperation were able to relate degree of tax 
compliance to sanction threat and conscience appeal. 
Subjects were randomly assigned, after selection from census 
data, to treatment and control groups. Prior to submission 
of 1962 tax returns, one group was subjected to an interview 
containing questions that suggested the possibility of 
sanction for dishonesty in reporting income. Another group 
was asked questions designed to remind them of their moral 
obligations, while a third group was interviewed but asked 
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no conscience appeal or sanction threat questions. A fourth 
group was not interviewed. The IRS then supplied adjusted 
gross income, tax deduction, and tax payment figures for the 
experimental and control groups as a whole for 1961 and 
1962. 
The results showed that both sanction threat and 
conscience appeal could induce greater conformity (both 
treatment groups had significantly higher reported income 
than the control groups), but conscience appeal was found to 
be more effective. The degree of effectiveness of each of 
the inducements was found to vary by social characteristics 
of the respondents, particularly socio-economic status. It 
was further discovered that sanction threat apparently 
generated, among a minority of subjects (35%), attempts to 
make up through greater deduction what they had lost in an 
honest reporting of income. Thus, despite the fact that the 
independent variables were not really threats or conscience 
appeal, and there was no measurement of the perceived 
reality or perceived probability ·of imposition of the 
sanction, the study strongly suggests that reminding 
individuals of the possibility of negative sanctions does 
help secure conformity. But it seems that bringing to mind 
possible sanctions may not be as effective in achieving 
compliance with norms as bringing to mind other things. 
19 
Clotfelter [1983] measured the effect of marginal tax 
rates and other factors on compliance. He was employed by 
the Office of Tax Administration of the Treasury Department. 
His data was obtained from the Taxpayer Compliance 
Management Program <TCMP) program for 1969 from 
approximately 47,000 tax returns. The author acknowledged 
that variables related to IRS activity such as audit rates, 
penalty rates, and the level of sanctions must influence 
taxpayer reporting behavior, but he left them out of his 
analysis because of the simultaneity problem <described 
earlier). Clotfelter's results indicate that tax compliance 
increases with age and the proportion of income derived from 
wages and salaries. Compliance was lower for those audited 
in more recent years, and evidence indicated that marginal 
tax rates had a positive relationship to evasion. 
Behavioral Studies on Factors 
Affecting Noncompliance 
Since most researchers in the field of tax compliance 
do not have access to an adequate data base from which to 
apply questions, behavioral methodologies have become widely 
used in compliance factors studies. The general approaches 
to the behavioral studies have taken three 
directions--surveys, simulations, and laboratory 
experiments. 
To date, surveys have been the most widely used. For 
example Mason and Calvin [1978, 1984] surveyed about 800 
Oregon households to examine demographic factors, the 
motivations relating to noncompliance, the level of 
noncompliance, the loss of revenue to the Oregon Department 
of Revenue because of noncompliance, and public confidence 
in the tax system. They found that lower and higher income 
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groups had the greatest amount of unreported income and that 
the middle income group had the least. Underreporting 
income was more likely among younger persons, those with 
more education, employed persons and students, the 
self-employed, and newer residents. The strongest 
motivation for noncompliance was the low perceived 
probability of being caught. Further analysis summarized in 
their 1984 paper was concluded with the indication that both 
taxpayers who are satisfied and those who are dissatisfied 
with the tax system remain honest because they are afraid of 
being caught. 
Spicer and Lundstedt [1976J used survey data to 
construct two indexes--a tax evasion index and a tax 
resistence index--to test their premise that the decision to 
evade is dependent not only upon perceived penalties, but on 
a set of attitudes and norms. They found that perceptions 
of tax inequity, the number of evaders known to the 
respondents personally, and previous experience with tax 
audits were all associated with a higher level of admitted 
tax evasion. They also found that the propensity to evade 
declined with age, income level, and perceived probability 
of detection. In addition they found that the propensity to 
evade increased as the proportion of income in wages, 
salaries, or pensions increased. 
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Song and Yarbough [1978] constructed an index of tax 
ethics on the basis of a 1975 survey of taxpayers in eastern 
North Carolina. It was concluded that the most important 
factor governing tax compliance was fear of detection. In 
general, they also concluded that married persons and 
homeowners had a higher level of tax ethics than single 
persons or renters. A higher level of income and a higher 
level of education were also related to good tax ethics. 
(This finding seemingly contradicts Mason and Calvin's 
[1978] result: Underreporting income was more likely among 
those with more education.) Tax ethics were found to be 
worse among those people who believed that tax evasion by 
others was common and among people who felt alienated, 
powerless, and distrustful. 
Lewis [1979] analyzed a 200-male taxpayer survey in 
Bath, U.K., during the summer of 1977. The measurement 
instrument consisted of 16 Likert attitude statements 
measured on 5-point scales. Factor analysis was applied. 
Lewis concluded that self-interest was the primary 
motivating force behind nomcompliance. Also, the results 
indicated that people with higher incomes have less 
favorable attitudes toward income taxes. 
Dean, Keenan, and Kenney [1980] examined attudes toward 
taxpaying by questioning a nonrandom sample of adults in 
Scotland. The respondents felt that people evade taxes 
primarily because taxes are too high or unfair and for 
economic reasons. Most felt that evasion was neither good 
nor bad, that opportunities for reducing one's taxes by a 
small amount through evasion were widespread, and that 
people would try to reduce their taxes by at least a small 
amount if they were unlikely to be caught. 
Grasmick and Bryjak [1980] suggested that a rational 
individual would not disregard their perceptions of the 
severity of legal penalty when confronted with a potential 
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compliance decision. They relied on expected utility theory 
to consider the association of interactive factors of 
noncompliance, severity and probability of sanctions, in the 
context of individuals perceiving detection probability to 
be relatively high. The authors surveyed 400 Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, residents collecting information about the 
respondents' past involvement in eight illegal activities: 
theft of an item worth less than $20, theft of an item worth 
$20 or more, illegal gambling, purposely hurting someone, 
cheating on tax returns, littering, illegal fireworks use, 
and driving while under the influence of alcohol. A 
perceived certainty of arrest was measured in addition to a 
perceived severity of punishment. The data appeared to 
suggest that perceived severity of punishment, when properly 
defined, operationalized, and interacted with certainty of 
arrest, is as significant a deterrent as perceived certainty 
of detection and arrest. 
Using the simulation approach Friedland, Maital, and 
Rutenberg [1978] examined the impact of different 
probabilities of audit, amount of fines, and tax rates on 
the decision to evade taxes. Fifteen undergraduate 
psychology students at Tel-Aviv University served as 
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subjects in the experiment. The experiment consisted of the 
subjects reporting an income and paying tax accordingly on a 
monthly basis for ten simulated months. The objective was 
for each subject to maximize his/her net income <gross 
income less fines). Fines were administered to randomly 
audited returns for evaded taxes. At the end of the 
experiment a small money prize was distributed in proportion 
to each subject's net income. Audit frequencies were 
maintained at the inverse of fine magnitude. Therefore the 
expected value of gains from evasion was zero. It was 
concluded that large fines tended to be more effective 
deterrents than frequent audits. Also, the authors 
concluded that even when audit frequencies are reduced 
proportionately, large fines appear to be more effective 
deterrents than small fines. This result was satisfying, 
but due to limitations of the study, it is not 
all-conclusive. Some of the limitations are that the sample 
size was very small, the probability of audit was an 
uncertainty and could have been a deterrent in its own 
right, the subjects had nothing real to lose in the 
experimental context, and that the authors feel that evasion 
is simply more acceptable in Mediterranean countries than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. They recommended replication and 
furthur study of the variables in question with regard to 
compliance. 
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Spicer and Becker [1980] using the same simulation 
methodology as Friedland, et al. [1978], examined the 
relationship between perceived inequities in the tax system. 
They used fifty-seven University of Colorado at Colorado 
Springs students as subjects. The sample was stratified 
using Spicer's evasion index [Spicer, 1974]. The authors 
concluded that those who perceived their tax rates to be 
higher than average evaded the highest proportion of their 
taxes. Those who perceived their tax rates to be lower than 
average evaded the lowest proportion of taxes. Gender was 
also a significant determinant of tax evasion, with males 
evading a larger proportion of taxes than females, al 1 other 
factors being equal. This finding concurs with that reached 
by Friedland, et al. [1978] but is contrary to the findings 
of Canning [1956] and Ackerman [1971]. 
Canning [1956] and Ackerman [1971] tested the effects 
of an honor system on classroom cheating. They used a 
self-grading procedure for students taking examinations. 
Canning conducted his experiment annually at Brigham Young 
University from 1948 <one year before an honor system was 
established) through 1953. He concluded that rates of 
cheating declined 63 percent over this period. 
Additionally, he determined that the average magnitude of 
cheating decreased by 33 percent. Before the honor system, 
male students cheated out of proportion to their number in 
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the total group. After five years of the system, the male 
proportion was reduced and females cheated 
disproportionately. Ackerman [1971] explored the effects of 
self-grading as compared to a conventional procedure on 
test-score outcomes. He concluded the effect of the honor 
procedure did not significantly have an effect on the test 
performances of the experimental classes. The difference in 
cheating between males and females was not significant. 
Tittle and Rowe [1973] focused on the comparison of the 
relative effects of a moral appeal and a sanction threat in 
deterring classroom cheating. The experimental task was 
self-grading a series of quizzes by students in sociology 
classes. The experiment demonstrated that the cheating 
could be deterred by the combination of a threat of 
detection and punishment. The moral appeal had no 
significant effect. The results are strongly supported by 
deterrence theory. 
Laufer [1985] used a generic task of self-assessment 
and reporting to determine if complexity has a significant 
impact on compliance. Two forms of complexity were 
examined: computational complexity and rule complexity. 
Undergraduate students were used as subjects and graded 
their own examinations in an actual classroom setting. 
were provided with instructions (rules> and forms for 
reporting their exam scores. The instructions and forms 
were constructed to capture two levels of computational 
complexity <simple and complex> and two levels of rule 
They 
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complexity <objective and subjective). The grade in the 
course was based upon the self-reported scores of the 
subjects. The author determined an exam score for each 
student <unbeknown to the students) and compared it to the 
reported score. It was concluded that complexity does not 
appear to be a significant factor in affecting the overall 
level of compliance. The presence of a strong motivation to 
comply may have been the cause for a lack of significant 
overt noncompliance. It was further concluded that there 
appears to be a significant relationship between the degree 
of computational complexity and the variability between 
reported and actual scores. Frequency and degree of errors 
increase as complexity increases. The conclusion drawn from 
the study is that a change in tax law which decreased 
complexity would likely promote a decrease in variability of 
errors but not affect the aggregate level of overt 
noncompliance. 
In a recent laboratory experiment Jackson and Jones 
[1985) measured the relative importance of the risk of 
detection and magnitude of monetary penalty in the tax 
evasion decision. Relying on prospect theory the authors 
posited that people do not differentiate accurately between 
small probabilities and focus instead on the magnitude of 
the gamble. A laboratory experiment was conducted using 
student-subjects at the University of Colorado at Boulder, 
the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Texas at 
Austin. The experiment was broken into two parts: a 
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noncontextual part where subjects were given questionnaires 
involving loss alternatives with small stated probabilities 
and a contextual part where subjects were given choices with 
regard to alternative detection/penalty structures in a tax 
evasion opportunity questionnaire. Both elements of the 
sanction structure were varied in the choice alternatives: 
choice one included a low probability of detection with the 
highest penalty; choice two contained a higher probability 
of detection with a lower penalty; choice three was neither 
sanction element. Results indicate that people prefer 
greater risk when the potential magnitude of loss is less. 
Also, the results suggest the taxpayer will be more 
sensitive to magnitude of a penalty than a probability of 
detection, and higher risk of detection was seen to be a 
weaker deterrent than increased penalties. 
The authors suggested several extensions to this work; 
continued foundational research in tax evasion, utilization 
of other research designs in the evasion/compliance 
environment, and further research on the importance of the 
magnitude of penalties. 
Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of prior research in 
compliance. Analytical and empirical research have not 
conclusively validated the relative magnitude of the primary 
sanction threat variables of deterrence--penalty and 
probability of detection. Most research on the probability 
of detection variable supports the theory that high 
probabilities of detection deter noncompliance. When a 
penalty variable has been studied in compliance or 
deterrence research, conclusions have'not definitively 
supported the theory of deterrence--higher penalties result 
in greater compliance. In tax compliance research 
specifically, the importance of the magnitude of penalties 
as a sanction threat is still questioned. Therefore, this 
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study has manipulated both primary sanction threat variables 
to observe their effects on compliance. 
The current study has utilized experimental generic 
task methodology to directly measure compliance/ 
noncompliance while varying an independent variable, 
penalties. The frequency of audit variable was fixed at a 
low discrete level in Phase One of this study to allow the 
controlled observation of the effect of varied magnitudes of 
penalties on compliance to a set of rules. In Phase Two of 
this study both the audit variable and the penalty variable 
were varied to observe their interactive effect on 
compliance. 
CHAPTER III 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
This study relies upon deterrence theory. A laboratory 
experiment was conducted in two phases. The first phase was 
to determine whether different magnitudes of penalties will 
affect the aggregate amount of compliance to a set of rules 
for self-grading examinations in an actual classroom setting 
with the frequency of audit held constant at a low level. 
Phase One was conducted during one complete semester of an 
academic year. The second phase of the experiment was to 
determine whether different magnitudes of penalties will 
affect the aggregate amount of compliance to a similar set 
of rules in a similar setting with the frequency of audit 
manipulated. Phase Two of the experiment was conducted 
during the academic semester following Phase One. 
This chapter will explain the experimental testing by 
describing the hypotheses that were tested, the experimental 
design, and the specific structure of the experiment. 
Statement of Hypothesis 
Deterrence theory predicts that with a higher penalty a 
greater proportion of a group should comply. A low 
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probability of detection <audit) will allow the potential 
cheater to focus on the magnitude of penalty that he or she 
must then compare against the possible gain from the 
cheating. If the perceived penalty is severe enough, the 
potential cheater may be deterred. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis tested in the first phase of the experiment is: 
Hd1: There wil 1 be no difference in 
the mean of noncompliance groups receiving 
relatively large penalties and groups 
receiving relatively small penalties given a 
constant low level of audit frequency for all 
groups. 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H.1: The mean of noncompliance will be 
less for groups with relatively large 
penalties than for groups with relatively 
small penalties given a constant low audit 
frequency for all groups. 
The theory of deterrence predicts that as the 
probability of detection increases the magnitude of 
30 
penalties becomes less important as a factor in the decision 
to comply or not to comply. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that was tested in the second phase of this study is: 
Ho2: There wil 1 be no difference in 
the mean of noncompliance groups receiving 
relatively large penalties and groups 
receiving relatively small penalties given a 
relatively larger level of audit frequency 
for al 1 groups. 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H.2: The mean of noncompliance will be 
less for groups with relatively large 
penalties than for groups with relatively 
small penalties given a relatively larger 
level of audit frequency for all groups. 
Design of the Laboratory Study 
The ideal experiment to study the tax compliance 
effects of different penalty structures would require an 
enormous sample. Ideally, groups of taxpayers in 
demographically matched populations would be subjected to 
different penalty structures under the Internal Revenue 
Code, followed by the measurement and comparison of the 
levels of noncompliance among the groups over a period of 
31 
several years. Such an immense study would be unmanageable, 
inequitable, and would violate current statutes on 
confidentiality. Furthermore, actual levels of compliance 
for items not subject to third party reporting would still 
be unobservable in this scenario. 
Laboratory experimentation offers several advantages 
over field study. The researcher can mitigate potentially 
confounding effects of many extraneous variables. The 
independent variable can be manipulated with relative ease. 
By careful design of the research, a cause-effect 
relationship can be established between the independent and 
dependent variables [Swieringa and Weick, 1982J. 
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This study examined compliance to a set of rules in a 
generic task laboratory setting. Generic tasks are used in 
laboratory studies of real world tasks which cannot be 
practically duplicated. A generic task is composed of 
common everyday behaviors. The task chosen in a laboratory 
experiment must clearly capture the essential 
interrelationships between the key real world variables. 
Birnberg and Nath [1968, pp. 44-45] stress the importance of 
having both explicit rewards and implicit rewards within an 
experiment to strengthen internal validity. The internal 
validity of a generic task is dramatically affected by the 
reward structure. It is important that the reward structure 
inherent in the generic task have valences similar to that 
of the real world task. Actual levels of compliance were 
observed in this experiment. 
The experimental task was the self-grading, self-
assessing of scores on course examinations by students 
enrolled in introductory accounting courses. The task is an 
extension of the experimental approaches used by Canning 
[1956], Tittle and Rowe [1973], and Laufer [1985]. Although 
the task is similar to that employed by other researchers, 
it was used in this study for the purpose of measuring the 
relative effects of different magnitudes of penalties and 
different probabilities of detection on classroom cheating. 
The task allows measurement of compliance to a set of 
grading and reporting rules. The inherent reward structure 
has similar valences to the real world task of interest. In 
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this experiment, the student has graded his/her own 
examination. The student has the incentive to complete the 
task since his/her reported scores earns a portion of the 
final course grade. In the real world task, the taxpayer 
can potentially increase his/her disposable income by 
noncompliance. The student can potentially increase his/her 
actual exam score by violation of grading rules. A student 
who cheats runs the risk of a loss in grade if audited. 
The study used undergraduate students as surrogates for 
the U.S. taxpaying public. The context of the experiment is 
a decision making task. The subjects were required to grade 
their examinations by making decisions in following a set of 
rules. 
cheat. 
The subject decided whether to cheat or not to 
There has been a considerable amount of research on the 
use of students as subject surrogates. <See, for example, 
[Copeland, Francia, Strawser, 1973], [Abdel-khalik, 1974], 
CAshton and Kramer, 1980], and [Krogstad, Ettenson, and 
Shanteau, 1984]). There has not been a concensus as to the 
overall research effect of students as surrogates. However, 
explicit consideration must be given to the appropriateness 
of students for the task. 
Ashton and Kramer [1980] used student subjects as 
surrogates in a study of auditors' internal control 
judgements. They concluded that students were acceptable 
surrogates for auditors making similar framed decisions. 
The authors generalized their conclusion to situations where 
students process information and make decisions. The 
experimental task in their study was an information 
processing and decision making task. 
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The students in this study were informed that a monitor 
would prepare and administer the midterm exams. The regular 
classroom instructor did not appear to be directly involved 
in the examination and grading process. Since the total 
classroom environment is a surrogate for the taxpaying 
environment, a reasonable analogy to the noncorrespondent 
relationship of taxpayers to the IRS was created. The 
classroom instructor was in a correspondent condition with 
the students and could have been a biasing factor if allowed 
to administer the exams and the rules for compliance. 
Friedland, Thibaut, and Walker [1973] based on an experiment 
using 96 undergraduate students playing a management game, 
concluded that a significantly higher level of compliance to 
a legislator's or enforcer's rules resulted when a strong 
correspondent condition was present. Laufer's [1985] 
results appeared to be biased by the correspondent 
condition. The fact that the researcher served as both the 
instructor and the exam monitor may have contributed to the 
higher than expected degree of compliance. Official 
communication from the monitor to students was handled via 
the U.S. mail. This communication procedure helped mitigate 
the correspondent condition. 
The proposed experiment began on the first day of class 
of a semester. The instructor distributed the course 
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syllabus and an information sheet which was completed by the 
students. The information sheet contained data such as 
address, schedule of classes, and grade point average. The 
instructor informed the students midterm exams will be 
self-graded. The students were told a monitor would prepare 
and administer the exams. The monitor was introduced, 
distributed an "Examination Procedures" document <Appendix 
A>, and explained the self-grading procedures and the 
general rules for compliance to the students. 
During the experiment, the students' semester letter 
grade was determined from four midterm exams and one 
comprehensive final. The midterm exams were graded by the 
students, and these self-reported scores were used toward 
grade determination. The midterm scores were weighted 
66.67% of the semester grade .. The final exam, worth 33.33% 
of the course grade, was graded by the instr~ctor. Semester 
letter grades, A, 8, C, D, and F, were awarded on the basis 
of the traditional 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, and below 60%, 
respectively, of total points possible <600) on five exams. 
To control for the possible effects of other reward 
variables on the decision to cheat or not, students were 
informed no other elements, such as quizzes or homework 
assignments, were used as determinants of the final course 
grade. 
The first exam was be used as a training run to 
acquaint the students with the actual procedures for 
self-grading. It was hoped that this practice would 
eliminate some of the bias caused by inexperience and 
uncertainty with what is expected. Additionally, it was 
hoped that it would strengthen the analogy of students in a 
compliance setting with experienced taxpayers in a 
compliance setting. Krogstead, Ettenson, and Shanteau 
[1984] have shown that experience in task performance 
affects reliability of decisions. Students were informed 
via grading instructions that the first self-graded midterm 
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exam would also be 100 percent investigator-graded. No risk 
of penalty for grading errors was incurred by the students. 
If there was a substantial difference between any student's 
reported and actual score, he/she met with the monitor to 
discuss the difficulty. The investigator-graded score was 
recorded for exam one. The experimental penalty treatments 
<and the experimental audit treatments in the second phase 
of the experiment) were applied to the three subsequent 
midterm examinations. 
Examinations were administered in a traditional 
classroom setting. The exams consisted of objective style 
questions and problems. Upon completion of the exam, the 
students submitted their exam papers and answer sheets to 
the monitor. During the time period from the end of the 
exami~~tion period until beginning of the next class 
meeting, all answer sheets were photocopied. The 
photocopied answer sheets were used by the researcher to 
determine a correct score. The students were not aware of 
the copying procedure. The exam papers were returned to the 
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students in the class period following the administration of 
the examination. Attached to the student's exam was a copy 
of each of the following: Grade Report Form Instructions, 
Grade Report Form, and Answer Key with explanations. 
Appendix B for examples). 
<See 
The Grade Report Form Instructions were the primary 
experimental instrument. Within that instrument, statements 
were made on the penalties for failure to follow the rules 
for self-grading. The penalty for noncompliance, 
negligence, or fraud was the independent variable of Phase 
One of the experiment and was varied across randomly 
selected subject groups. The penalties varied from zero, to 
two times the difference between reported and actual scores, 
to ten times the difference. The largest magnitude was 
intended to appear relatively severe to a potential cheater, 
but there has not been any evidence presented in the 
scientific literature establishing definite penalties that 
deter noncompliance. 
The percentage of exams audited remained constant at 4% 
throughout Phase One of the experimental stage of the study. 
A varied percentage may be a deterrent itself. Therefore, 
the second phase of the study was conducted to observe the 
interactive effect of varied percentages of audits and 
varied penalty magnitudes. The percentage of exams audited 
was varied between 12% and 24% during Phase Two. The Grade 
Report Form Instructions stated that a discrete number of 
exams and Grade Report Forms would be audited. This number 
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will correspond to a certain percentage of the class size, 
and was adjusted downward as student withdrawals required. 
The computation of this number was demonstrated on the Grade 
Report Form Instructions. Tversky and Kahnemen [1971] have 
suggested that students have difficulty in assessing 
probabilities of event occurrences. Percentage figures 
alone could possibly bias the treatment variables. The 
combination of percentage and discrete number information 
gave the subjects a fairly concrete perception of their 
audit potential. 
A manipulation check [Sudman and Bradburn, 1982, p.247J 
was incorporated into the Grade Report Form to help insure 
that the student subjects were aware of their penalty 
treatments and the percentage of exams to be audited. The 
subjects were asked to write their penalty rate and the 
percentage of e~ams to be audited, as stated in the Grade 
Report Form Instructions, on the Grade Report Form. 
The students were given approximately one week to 
perform the grading task. The due date was stated in the 
Grade Report Form Instructions. Students submitted their 
Grade Report Forms to the monitor at the beginning of class 
in their usual room at their regular class time. Students 
were not required to prepare other documentation. If 
students were not timely in submitting their forms, 
penalties were assessed as per the instruction instrument. 
Students were notified by mail if such a condition applied. 
The exam scores as reported on the Grade Report Forms were 
compared to the actual score computed by the researcher. 
To reinforce the probability of detection, audits were 
actually conducted. Exams were randomly chosen for audit. 
<The amount of cheating as indicated by the difference 
between reported and actual scores had no bearing on the 
audit selection>. The term 'random' was not used to 
describe this procedure to the students. Although a random 
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selection technique was used, the wording was important to 
convey the desired meaning. Slavic, Kunreuther, and White 
[1974, p. 203] have indicated that individuals have a 
difficult time in rationalizing the idea of randomness. 
Students were told that exams would be selected for audit by 
drawing names from a hat. 
When a student was randomly selected for an audit, 
she/he was notified by mail of the time and place of a 
meeting with the monitor. The student returned a 
confirmation card enclosed with the audit letter. The 
actual audit was conducted much like an IRS office audit. 
Actual answer sheets and complete exam papers were copied 
for use by the monitor during the audit. The audited 
student was asked to provide support for the way in which 
the exam was graded. The penalties applied for defalcations 
were stated in the students' Grade Report Form Instructions. 
The penalties were deducted from the experimenter-graded 
<true) score. Since the concern of the experiment is to 
observe deterrence of overt acts of noncompliance, 
inadvertant errors were given favorable status when 
reasonable explanations were provided by the student. This 
objective may have been difficult to achieve, but was given 
consideration. 
After completion of the audit phase of each 
examination, an announcement was made to the students by 
each class•s instructor as to the general results of the 
audit. An example statement might be, "Eighteen students 
had their grading checked by the monitor and fourteen were 
found to have no discrepancies; four received penalties." 
This announcement reinforced the concept that audits 
potentially existed, and it was especially important for 
those students who were not directly affected by audits. 
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The announcements in the experimental settings were 
analogous to newspaper, radio, and television reports of IRS 
activity. 
Experimental Ethics 
Keys and Hendricks [19841 define 'ethics' as the area 
of intentional human behavior that affects the well-being of 
others and can be categorized as right or wrong. In the 
academic research environment ethics may refer to a set of 
moral principles which govern the conduct of research. 
Keys and Hendricks discuss the ethical researcher's 
obligations to protect the subject's right to privacy and 
his right to receive results. They also discuss the roles 
of deception and debriefing in laboratory research. 
The right to privacy includes obtaining the willing 
41 
consent of the subjects and maintaining the confidentiality 
of the data. In the current study the student-subjects were 
given the opportunity to opt out of the self-grading scheme 
or transfer sections with no stigma attached. 
not coerced into remaining in the test group. 
Students were 
Since each 
student reported his/her own exam results, the task should 
have been taken seriously. 
The second requirement in insuring privacy includes 
maintaining confidentiality of collected data. In the 
current research, differences between a student's reported 
exam score and his/her actual exam score were available only 
in aggregate form. The instructors were apprised only of 
subjects' reported scores. This information was used for 
the purpose of intrasemester withdrawals and for issuing 
final semester letter grades. 
By necessity, a degree of deception was incorporated 
into the experiment. Full disclosure of the procedure by 
which the researcher has a copy of each exam would 
extinguish the very behavior of interest. The deception 
factor was not used in a way that would jeopardize a 
student's semester grade. 
After the study was completed each semester, a 
debriefing session was conducted. A questionnaire was used 
to determine whether the experimental task was performed as 
intended. Students were given the opportunity to ask 
questions about the study. The deception of copying all 
examination answer sheets was maintained after Phase One, 
since that deception was necessary in Phase Two. 
Phase Two was completed, the copying procedure was 
disclosed. 
After 
Students' rights to receive results was satisfied by 
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the internal experimental design. The student knows his/her 
reported exam scores. She/he knows if any overt act of 
noncompliance was committed. 
In compliance with University and College of Business 
policy, all necessary forms were timely filed by the 
researcher. These were duly accepted, giving approval for 
the use of human subjects in this laboratory experiment. 
Copies of the approval are on file in the Office of Business 
and Economic Research of Oklahoma State University. The 
aforementioned ethics issues were addressed within the 
approved documentation. 
Results of a Pilot Study 
A pilot study of the experiment was conducted during 
the summer semester of 1985 on one principles of accounting 
class section of 23 students. The primary purpose was to 
test the validity of the instruments and experimental 
treatment methods. On the basis of preliminary findings 
some minor modifications were made during the test period 
and/or for the subsequent proposed experiment. 
During the pilot study the class instructor reported 
that the students were quite aware of the separation between 
instructor and monitor. Feedback in the form of expressions 
and verbal responses indicated that the correspondent 
condition is strong with the instructor, but weak with the 
monitor. The monitor apparently was perceived as an 
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adversary. The instructor was perceived as more of a friend 
by the students. The analogy of the monitor to the IRS, as 
far as separation is concerned, appears to have been in 
place. 
The pilot study uncovered the fact that the students 
had difficulty grading exam problems where partial credit 
was allocated with some degree of subjectivity through 
sequential steps. Although detailed grading explanations 
were in the answer keys, students who were audited and 
informal conversations with students related the tendency to 
be more conservative and overcautious when scoring with 
subjective rules. The majority of both frequency and 
magnitude of cheating occurred on the objective exam 
questions. Apparently, the inexperience of making decisions 
when confronted with subjective rules dominated the decision 
of whether to overtly cheat. Objective question rules were 
understood by the subjects. The only decision left for the 
subjects was the cheating decision. To eliminate the 
potential effects on compliance that some subjective grading 
may cause, only objective style questions and grading rules 
were used (and were used on the two final midterm exams of 
the pilot study). 
Students in the pilot study group appeared to be aware 
of the low, constant probability of audit. In conversations 
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with both the instructor and the monitor, students reported 
they were aware of the magnitude of penalty on various exams 
and the constant probability of audit. These observations 
are crucial, since they suggest the experimental treatments 
are being effectively applied. Conversations also revealed 
the students were not aware of the copying procedure of the 
exam answer sheets. Therefore, the students' decisions to 
comply or not to comply with the grading instructions were 
not biased by this potential deterrent. 
After administration and grading of the fourth midterm 
exam, debriefings were conducted and an exit questionnaire 
was administered. Several personal interviews were also 
conducted to verify the structure of the test instruments 
and to uncover any other possible problems. 
problems were found. 
Statistical Design 
No other 
The indication of compliance to rules is the difference 
between the correct score, determined by the researcher, and 
the student's self-reported scores. Therefore this 
difference factor will be the measure used to determine 
noncompliance in the experiment. 
A counterbalanced experimental design [Campbell and 
Stanley, 1963, pp. 50-52J was used. The specific arrange-
ment was a Latin square. The general plan for applying 
treatments was as follows in Figure 1, although the arrange-
ment of the treatments was varied for each class section. 
Class Section One 
Exam #2 Exam #3 Exam #4 
First Exam Score 
Top Group X y z 
Mid Group y z X 
Low Group z X y 
Figure 1. Latin Square Design 
Each individual class section was subjected to one 
probability of random audit throughout the entire semester 
in which the experiment was conducted. In Phase One of the 
experiment ten class sections were utilized. All ten class 
sections were audited at the 4% level. In Phase Two, eight 
class sections were utilized; four class sections were 
audited at a level of 12% and four class sections were 
audited at a level of 24%. 
The rows of the square represent the partitioning of a 
class by relative rank of scores earned on the first midterm 
exam of the semester. That is, the one-third of the 
students scoring highest on Exam I became one experimental 
unit <Top Group>. The middle third of the class became a 
second experimental unit <Mid Group), and the bottom third 
became the third experimental unit <Low Group). Due to a 
high class drop rate, the initial actual treatment 
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applications were to partitioned groups comprising 
approximately 25 percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent of the 
students to Groups Top, Mid, and Low, respectively. 
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Partitioning the subjects by Exam I score aids in 
controlling for the effects of variables such as, 
opportunity to cheat and perceived difficulty of exam on the 
dependent variable, noncompliance. A difference in 
opportunity to cheat exists due to relatively different 
scores on examinations. For example, a score of 45 out of 
100 points allows a student-subject greater opportunity than 
a score of 90 out of 100. Also, the incentive to cheat 
would apparently differ among groups. For example, a 
student earning a very high score honestly would have no 
incentive to cheat. A student earning a failing score might 
have a powerful incentive to cheat. The pilot study 
indicated that there are significant differences between 
score-partitioned group means of noncompliance. 
The columns of the square represent the three different 
midterm exams upon which the treatments were applied. The 
partitioning by exam aided in controlling for a maturation 
effect and significant differences in perceived difficulty 
between exams. The letters X, Y, and Z represent the 
treatments (different magnitudes of penalty). X denotes a 
penalty of zero. Y indicates a penalty of two times the 
difference between actual and reported exam scores. Z 
indicates a penalty of ten times the difference between 
actual and reported exam scores. 
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ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis of no difference 
in treatment means in the Latin square design. To test all 
possible comparisons of the treatment means the Duncan 
multiple range test was applied [Steele and Terrie, 1980, p. 
186]. The Duncan procedure controls the Type I 
comparisonwise error rate [SAS, 1982, p. 174]. By using ten 
replications of the 3 x 3 Latin square design adequate 
degrees of freedom are available to pass significance 
judgments on the statistical results of the Phase One 
experiment. Eight replications of the 3 x 3 Latin square 
design were used in Phase Two of the experiment. Four of 
the replicates were audited at the 12% level, and four of 
the replicates were audited at the 24% level. The 
replications are different class sections of the first 
Principles of Accounting course. The number of replications 
was constrained by the number of class sections offered by 
administration in a semester. The Phase Two design was a 
split, split-plot with sub-unit treatments in a Latin square 
[Cochran and Cox, 1957, pp. 306-311]. 
Summary 
This chapter presented the design and procedures used 
in conducting the experiments. Also discussed were the 
results of a pilot study and statistical experimental 
designs utilized. External validity generally can not be 
achieved with certainty when laboratory experiment 
methodology is used. But the external validity of the 
current experiment, in addition to the internal validity, 
was apparently enhanced through experimental realism. The 
specific generic task methodology used allowed for a high 
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degree of experimental realism to be achieved. The task was 
real, not hypothetical. The task contained an inherent 
reward structure, the course grade. Also, the subject 
involvement in the experiment was similar to the decision 
making processes taxpayers go through when determining their 
tax liability. 
A pilot study indicated that the experimental 
methodology employed was believable to the subjects and they 
took the task seriously. Also, it was apparent that 
subjective type exam questions and answers were a biasing 
factor in measuring noncompliance. Therefore, only 
objective type questions were used in the examinations 
during the experimental periods. 
For the purpose of determining the impact of different 
magnitudes of penalties and different probabilities of 
detection on noncompliance, a Latin square experimental 
design was used. Internal validity of the experiment should 
be enhanced through use of this design. Also, this design 
allowed for statistical analysis of the effect of different 
magnitudes of penalties and different probabilities of 
detection on noncompliance using ANOVA procedures. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM 
PHASE ONE 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of Phase One of the 
experiment are provided. 
analyzed and discussed. 
presented. 
The results of the experiment are 
An interpretation of the results is 
Results of Analysis of Data 
From the Experiment 
The objective of Phase One of this study was to 
determine whether relatively higher magnitudes of penalties 
have a greater deterrent on noncompliance, given a 
relatively low (4 percent>, constant perceived probability 
of detection. Toward this end, an experiment was designed 
to allow for manipulation of independent variables so the 
experimental effect of the treatments could be measured. 
The dependent variable in the model was a measure of 
noncompliance, the difference between reported exam scores 
and actual exam scores. The independent variables within 
the model were <1> examinations, <2> partitioned groups of 
student subjects, and <3> the treatment, penalty magnitude. 
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Penalty magnitudes of zero, twice the difference between the 
actual and reported exam scores, and ten times that 
difference were applied. By using ten different class 
sections concurrently, the experiment was replicated ten 
times. A total of 483 students were enrolled in the 
classes. The results of the ANOVA for the Latin square 
arrangement are presented in Table II. 
TABLE I I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE STATISTICS--
FULL MODEL OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
PHASE ONE 
Source 
of 
Variation 
Penalty 
Groups 
Examinations 
Class Sections 
Section X Exams 
Section X Groups 
Section X Penalty 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
2, 20 
2, 20 
2, 20 
9, 20 
18, 20 
18, 20 
18, 20 
F 
Ratio 
56.06 
12.95 
5.10 
2.75 
0.87 
1. 89 
1. 73 
Observed 
Significance 
Level 
.0001 
.0002 
.0162 
.0286 
.6100 
.0849 
.1175 
Use of ANOVA with three levels of the penalty factor 
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resulted in a two-tailed test of the hypothesis, rather than 
the one-tailed test indicated in the hypothesis statement. 
Based upon the data collected and procedures utilized, the 
null hypothesis of no treatment effect is rejected because 
the F ratio of 56.06 has an observed significance level less 
than 1 percent with 2 and 20 degrees of freedom. The 
significant difference between the magnitude of penalty 
treatments indicates the level of noncompliance was affected 
by the magnitude of penalties--relatively lower 
noncompliance to rules resulted in conjunction with 
relatively greater statutory penalties. 
The treatment effect (penalty> is interpreted to be 
independent. That is, the differences in the responses, the 
means of noncompliance, to the three treatments would be the 
same whether other factors are present or not. This 
conclusion is derived from Table II where the results of the 
test of the interaction between class sections and penalties 
is presented. The F ratio of 1.73 with 18 and 20 degrees of 
freedom has an observed significance level of 11.75 percent. 
The presence of an interaction is not greatly supported. 
Furthermore, the graph in Figure 2 <Appendix D> depicts the 
independence of the penalty magnitude treatments from the 
class section factor with regard to the mean of 
noncompliance. Independence is not conclusively supported 
by the graph. Some low level of interaction may be present. 
Therefore, Duncan's multiple range test was conducted to 
compare the penalty means separately for each class section. 
The ranking of penalty means does not differ for any of the 
class sections. In short, the nature of the differences 
between penalty treatments does not significantly depend on 
which class section is investigated. The main effects of 
the treatment, penalties, are presumed to be independent. 
ANOVA indicated the penalty means are different from 
each other but not which means differ from which other 
means. Table III displays the comparison of the penalty 
magnitude means of noncompliance. 
TABLE III 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
PENALTY MAGNITUDES 
PHASE ONE 
Penalty 
Magnitude 
Mean of Test 
Observations Noncompliance Grouping 
Zero 30 9.14 A 
2 x noncompliance 30 4.72 B 
10 x noncompliance 30 1.96 c 
Overall 90 5.27 
Based upon the Duncan procedure for multiple 
comparisons, the null hypothesis of equal penalty treatment 
means is rejected at the testing level of alpha equal to 
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five percent. The different letters <i.e., A, B, and C> 
show that the three penalty means are significantly 
different from each other at the five percent testing level 
for significant differences. These results validate a 
portion of the general theory of deterrence--relatively 
greater penal.ty levels deter noncompliance. 
The experiment was designed to account for possible 
effects on noncompliance due to different subject groups, 
different examinations, different class sections 
(replications), and different penalty magnitudes. From 
Table II it can be seen that all of variables produce an 
effect on the dependent variable, noncompliance, at the 
significance level of five percent. 
The three subject groups represent the partitioning of 
a class by relative rank of scores earned on the first 
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midterm exam of the semester. That is, the one-third of the 
students scoring highest on Exam I became one experimental 
unit <Top Group>. The middle third of the class became a 
second experimental unit <Mid Group), and the bottom third 
became the third experimental unit <Low Group). The results 
of this partitioning of the subjects by Exam I score 
indicates that factors such as, opportunity to cheat, 
perceived difficulty of exam, and the amount of incentive to 
cheat would apparently differ among groups on their effect 
on the dependent variable, noncompliance. This result was 
anticipated and is not construed to be abnormal. A 
difference in opportunity to cheat exists due to relatively 
different scores on examinations. For example, a score of 
45 out of 100 points allows a student-subject greater 
opportunity than a score of 90 out of 100. A 1 so, the 
incentive to cheat apparently differs among groups. For 
example, a student earning a very high score honestly would 
have no incentive to cheat. A student earning a failing 
score might have a powerful incentive to cheat. The mean 
amounts of noncompliance relative to the partitioned groups 
and the results of the Duncan test are shown in Table IV. 
TABLE IV 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
PARTITIONED GROUPS 
PHASE ONE 
Partitioned Mean of Test 
Subject Groups Observations Noncompliance Grouping 
Top Group 30 3.42 A 
Mid Group 30 5.56 B 
Low Group 30 6.84 B 
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The table indicates that the Mid and Low Groups are not 
significantly different from each other with regard to 
noncompliance. Both are significantly different from the 
Top Group. Apparently, the Top Group reflected their lower 
incentive and opportunity to cheat through the significantly 
lower mean noncompliance i.e., less cheating. The Mid and 
Top Groups had more opportunity and more incentive to cheat. 
The Examination variable represents the three different 
midterm exams upon which the treatments, penalties, were 
applied. Table II indicates examinations did produce an 
effect upon noncompliance. The F ratio of this effect, 
5.10, with 2 and 20 degrees of freedom says that the effect 
is not significant at the one percent level; however, at the 
level of five percent, the effect due to different 
examinations is significant. Because of repeated testing, 
maturation, experience, and cumulative carryover, this 
variable could be expected to be significant. Table V 
presents the means of noncompliance relative to this 
independent variable, Examinations, and the results of the 
Duncan test. 
Examinations 
Exam 2 
Exam 3 
Exam 4 
TABLE V 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
EXAMINATIONS 
PHASE ONE 
Observations 
30 
30 
30 
Mean of 
Noncompliance 
4. 10 
5.48 
6.24 
Test 
Grouping 
A 
A B 
B 
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Table V shows the increasing trend in the means of 
noncompliance relative to the examinations. Exams 2 and 4 
are shown to be significantly different from each other but 
not from Exam 3. The maturation or experience factor seems 
to have a significant effect upon noncompliance at the level 
of alpha equal to five percent in this experiment. 
TABLE VI 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
CLASS SECTIONS 
PHASE ONE 
--------------------------------------------------------
Class Mean of Test 
Section Teacher Observations Noncompliance Grouping 
--------------------------------------------------------
7 2 9 7.715 A 
4 1 9 6.638 A B 
5 2 9 6.571 A B 
1 3 9 6.068 A B 
3 1 9 5.093 A B 
10 3 9 4.879 A B 
6 2 9 4.473 A B 
9 3 9 4.213 A B 
8 3 9 4. 198 A 8 
2 1 9 2.874 8 
-------------------------------------------------------
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The variable, Class Sections, represented the different 
class sections or replications on which the experiment was 
conducted. From Table II it can be seen this variable, with 
an observed significance level less than five percent, has a 
significant effect on the dependent variable, noncompliance. 
This result was unexpected. Since the same examinations 
were given in all ten classes and experimental procedures 
were administered in a like manner for all class sections, 
those factors should not have produced a significant effect. 
Table VI presents the mean amounts of noncompliance for each 
section and the results of the Duncan test for differences 
among the ten class sections. It shows that class sections 
7 and 2 are significantly different from each other but not 
from the other eight sections at the level of alpha equal to 
five percent. Possibly factors such as peer pressure within 
a specific section, time of day, different class 
instructors, or other factors aided in producing the effect 
upon noncompliance. 
Three different instructors covered the 10 class 
sections. Whether an instructor was liked <or disliked>, 
perceived to be good <or bad), or perceived fair <or unfair) 
could have biased compliance to a set of rules and 
sanctions. Possibly, students who liked an instructor 
complied, in part, for the instructor. Conversely, it is 
possible that students may have had higher noncompliance, if 
the instructor was disliked. For some students, good or 
fair may have been the perception<s> that had biasing 
effects upon compliance. Whether, or not, a specific 
instructor was liked may not have been relevant. An 
instructor may have been perceived fair or good, but was 
disliked. Compliance may have been enhanced by the 
perceptions of fairness or goodness. Conversely, students 
perceiving their instructor(s) to be unfair, or bad, may 
have felt a compulsion to cheat. These students may have 
felt disadvantaged. Cheating, or not following the rules, 
was a means to gain, or regain, perceived proper advantage 
in their class. Table VI shows that the two outlier class 
sections, 2 and 7, were taught by different instructors. 
There does not appear to be a discernible pattern of 
noncompliance by instructor. 
Summary 
Based on analyses of the results it appears that 
differing levels of the treatment, penalties, will effect 
noncompliance. However, differing levels of other 
independent variables also had significant effects on the 
independent variable. Subject groups partitioned by 
relative exam score, different examinations, and 
replications represented by different class sections 
indicated effects upon noncompliance. 
These results are not surprising. Individuals reach 
decisions processing many, many factors. Even if all 
factors applicable to one decision setting could be 
identified, it is very difficult to isolate one factor from 
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all of the other relevant factors. 
The following chapter will discuss the analysis of data 
of an experiment where an additional variable, audit 
frequency is addressed. Also, the possible interaction of 
treatment variables will be analyzed. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM 
PHASE TWO 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the second phase of the 
experiment are provided. 
analyzed and discussed. 
presented. 
The results of this experiment are 
An interpretation of the results is 
Results of Analysis of Data 
From the Experiment 
The objective of Phase Two of this study was to 
determine whether relatively higher magnitudes of penalties 
have a greater deterrent on noncompliance, given a 
relatively greater perceived probability of detection. 
Toward this end, the experiment conducted as Phase One was 
modified to include an additional independent variable, 
audit levels. Other independent variables within the model 
were (1) partitioned groups of student subjects, <2> 
examinations, (3) class sections, and (4) penalty magnitude. 
The penalty magnitudes applied were zero, twice the 
difference between the actual and reported exam scores, and 
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ten times that difference. Eight class sections contained 
the experimental units on which the experiment was 
conducted. A total of 451 students were enrolled in these 
sections. Four of the sections had an audit level of 12 
percent applied, and four sections received an audit level 
of 24 percent. The results of the ANOVA are presented in 
Table VI I. 
TABLE VI I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE STATISTICS--
MODEL OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
PHASE TWO 
Source 
of 
Variation 
Audit 
Penalty 
Audit X Penalty 
Examinations 
Audit X 
Examinations 
Groups 
Audit X Groups 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
1, 6 
2, 52 
2, 52 
2, 52 
2, 52 
2, 52 
2, 52 
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F 
Ratio 
16.52 
34.08 
0.36 
1. 65 
0.82 
29.60 
5. 17 
Observed 
Significance 
Level 
0.0066 
0.0001 
0.6989 
0.2027 
0.4449 
0.0001 
0.0090 
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ANOVA is used to test the independence of the treatment 
effect, penalty magnitude. The test examines whether a 
tradeoff exists for subjects between penalty magnitude and 
the level of audit. That is, the test examines whether the 
relative effect of the penalty treatment on noncompliance 
would be the same regardless of the level of audit. The 
Penalty x Audit interaction is the measure of independence. 
Since the observed significance level of the interaction is 
0.6989, apparently the interaction is not present. A 
comparison of Penalty means is not dependent on the level of 
Audit in this experiment. This result is surprising. 
Grasmick and Bryjak [1980] hypothesized that rational 
individuals who perceive the certainty of apprehension as 
high will be influenced by the seriousness of punishment if 
apprehended. Whereas, regardless of the perceived 
consequence of being caught, individuals do not regard it as 
a potential cost, if they believe they will not be caught. 
The results of these authors' analyses supported their 
prediction of the interactive effect between perceived 
severity of penalty and perceived certainty of apprehension 
in their study. The means of noncompliance to penalty level 
by audit level for the present study are shown in Table 
VI I I • The pattern of the response variable means is as 
anticipated from the general theory of deterrence. The mean 
of noncompliance decreased as both the penalty magnitude and 
audit frequency increased, but statistically the interactive 
relationship is not significant. 
TABLE VIII 
MEANS OF NONCOMPLIANCE--
PENALTY BY AUDIT 
PHASE TWO 
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Penalty 
Magnitude 
Audit Frequency 
12% 24% 
Zero 9.934 6.259 
2 x noncompliance 5.475 2.888 
10 x noncompliance 3.654 0.991 
Responses to the post-experimental questionnaire 
indicate the subjects in this experiment appeared to be 
aware of the audit and penalty levels and the interaction of 
these variables. That is, the subjects reflected that the 
importance of the penalty level with regard to noncompliance 
depended on the level of audit. There apparantly was a 
trade-off taking place. Fifty-nine percent of the subjects 
indicated that larger-sized statutory penalties caused them 
to refrain from cheating. Also, 80 percent of the subjects 
stated that their probability of being audited increased 
their compliance to the rules and instructions. Fifty-seven 
percent of the subjects indicated that if their probability 
64 
of audit was close to zero they would not be very concerned 
about the size of the possible penalty. Whereas, 71 percent 
of the subjects stated that at a probability of audit near 
100 percent they would be very concerned with the size of 
the possible penalty. Although the subjects were aware of 
the penalty and audit relationship, based on these 
responses, it appears that many other factors were present 
in the individuals' decision processes in this experiment. 
In a compliance or noncompliance setting the significance of 
the interaction of factors such as audit and penalty levels 
may be lessened due to many of these other factors. Some of 
these factors may be maturation, experience, peer pressure, 
or celerity in detection or penalty imposition. 
Since the interaction was not present, it is possible 
to make an overall comparison of Penalty treatments averaged 
over all levels of Audit frequency. Use of ANOVA given 
three levels of the Penalty factor resulted in a two-tailed 
test of the hypothesis. Based upon the data collected and 
procedures utilized, the null hypothesis of no penalty 
treatment effect is rejected because the F ratio of 34.08 
has an observed significance level of 0.0001 with 2 and 52 
degrees of freedom. The significant difference between the 
magnitude of penalty treatments indicates the level of 
noncompliance was affected by the magnitude of penalties. 
Table IX displays the average magnitude of noncompliance by 
the three penalty magnitudes and the results of Duncan's 
Multiple Range Test. 
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Based upon the Duncan procedure for multiple 
comparisons, the null hypothesis of equal penalty treatment 
means is rejected at the testing level of alpha equal to 
five percent. The average amount of noncompliance for each 
penalty magnitude was significantly different from each of 
the others in the Phase Two test. This result, as with 
Phase One's result, validates a portion of the general 
theory of deterrence--relatively greater penalty levels 
deter noncompliance. Individuals are apparently deterred 
from cheating as the statutory penalty level is increased in 
this experimental setting. 
TABLE IX 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
PENALTY MAGNITUDES 
PHASE TWO 
Penalty 
Magnitude Observations 
Zero 24 
2 x noncompliance 24 
10 x noncompliance 24 
Over a 1 l 72 
Mean of 
Noncompliance 
8.097 
4.182 
2.323 
4.865 
Test 
Grouping 
A 
8 
c 
The second treatment variable of interest in Phase Two 
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of the experiment is audit frequency. This variable had two 
levels, 12 percent and 24 percent. <Phase One utilized a 
constant audit level of four percent). As shown in Table 
VII, this variable, audit, is significant at a level of 
0.0066. The means for the two levels of audit are shown in 
Tab 1 e X. 
Audit 
Frequency 
12 percent 
24 percent 
TABLE X 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
AUDIT FREQUENCY 
PHASE TWO 
Observations 
36 
36 
Mean of 
Noncompliance 
6.355 
3.379 
Test 
Grouping 
A 
B 
The means of the two audit frequency levels are 
significantly different at the level of alpha equal to five 
percent. As the audit frequency increased, the mean of 
noncompliance decreased. Individuals were apparently 
deterred from cheating as their probabilities of detection 
increased in this experiment. 
An F ratio of 29.60 with an observed significance level 
Of 0.0001 shows that the variable Groups has a significant 
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effect on the response variable, noncompliance. The results 
of the partitioned Groups of the subjects by Exam I score 
indicates that variables such as, opportunity to cheat~ 
perceived difficulty of exam, and the amount of incentive to 
cheat would apparently differ among groups on their effect 
on the dependent variable, noncompliance. This result was 
anticipated and is not construed to be abnormal. The mean 
amounts of noncompliance relative to the partitioned groups 
and the results of the Duncan test are shown in Table XI. 
Partitioned 
TABLE XI 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
PARTITIONED GROUPS 
PHASE TWO 
Mean of Test 
Groups of Subjects Observations Noncompliance Grouping 
Top Group 24 1.998 A 
Mid Group 24 5.129 B 
Low Group 24 7.474 c 
Table XI indicates that the three groups are 
significantly different at the level of alpha equal to five 
percent. Apparently, the Top Group reflected their lower 
incentive and opportunity to cheat through the significantly 
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lower mean noncompliance i.e., less cheating. The Mid and 
Low Groups had more opportunity and more incentive to cheat. 
This result is similar that of Phase One, with one 
exception. In the present test all three means are 
significantly different. In Phase One the Mid and Low 
Groups were.significantly different from the Top Group but 
not from each other. There is not a definitive explanation 
for this difference. 
TABLE XI I 
DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST--
EXAMINATIONS 
PHASE TWO 
Mean of Test 
Examinations Observations Noncompliance Grouping 
Exam 2 24 5.429 A 
Exam 3 24 5.013 B 
Exam 4 24 4.159 c 
The Examination variable represents the three different 
midterm exams upon which the treatments, penalties, were 
applied. Table VII indicates examinations did not produce 
an effect upon noncompliance. The observed significance 
level of this effect is greater than 5 percent. Because all 
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of the examinations were constructed to attain an equivalent 
difficulty and could simply be construed as occasions, it is 
reasonable to expect this factor to be insignificant. At 
the same time, due to repeated measures and the effects of 
maturation, it would be reasonable to anticipate a 
significant difference as was discovered in Phase One <Table 
V>. The conflicting results between the two phases of the 
experiment do not have an explanation beyond experimental 
error. Table XII presents the means of noncompliance 
relative to this independent variable, examinations, and the 
results of the Duncan test. 
Summary 
Based on analyses of the results it appears that 
differing levels of the treatment, penalties, will effect 
noncompliance. Also, differing levels of the other 
independent variable of concern, audit frequency, had 
significant effects on the independent variable. These 
results were anticipated. They verify the general theory of 
deterrence--lower noncompliance follows higher magnitudes of 
penalties and higher probabilites of audit. 
The interaction of penalties and audit frequencies was 
not determined to be significant. This result is 
surprising. 
deterrence. 
It is apparently contrary to the theory of 
Prior research has shown the existence of an 
interactive effect in certain situations. The interactive 
affect of the two factors in the present study may have 
become lost by the subjects. That is, since individuals 
reach decisions processing many factors, the interactive 
effect of penlties and audit frequencies may have become 
confounded with other factors. Even if all factors 
applicable to one decision setting could be identified, it 
is very difficult to isolate the relative importance of one 
factor from all of the other relevant factors. 
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The following chapter will discuss the conclusions that 
have been reached from these experiments. Also, the 
limitations of this research and suggestions for future 
research will be presented. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief 
overview of the research, provide conclusions drawn from the 
study, discuss the limitations of the study and offer 
recommendations for future reseach. 
Overview 
The purpose of this research was to determine if 
increased penalty magnitudes have a significant impact on 
noncompliance with a self-assessing and reporting system. 
Increasing levels of penalties were examined under two 
scenarios regarding audit frequency. The first phase of the 
study utilized a low, constant audit level. This situation 
is of interest because the increase in taxpayer 
noncompliance has been, in part, attributed to low levels of 
IRS auditing. Therefore, by increasing the level of 
penalties through reliance on the general theory of 
deterrence,· greater compliance (or lower noncompliance) 
should result. The second phase of the study examined the 
noncompliance and penalty magnitude relationship under an 
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increasing audit scenario. 
Practical and legal constraints do not allow for a 
direct study of tax noncompliance existing in the society of 
the United States. Therefore, this research project made 
use of a generic task laboratory experiment methodology. 
The experiment was constructed with undergraduate students 
as surrogates for taxpayers. The student subjects graded 
their own examinations. To allow for this task, the 
students were provided with instructions and forms to use in 
determining and reporting their examination scores. This 
was the task surrogate for determining and reporting a tax 
liability. The instructions were detailed to explain the 
varying treatment levels. The forms contained a 
manipulation check to insure the subjects were aware of 
their specific treatments. The examination scores reported 
by the students were used for course grade determination 
purposes. Unknown to the students was the fact that the 
researcher also determined an exam score (i.e., the correct 
score) for each student. The differences between the 
reported and correct scores (i.e., noncompliance) were 
statistically analyzed. Also, a post experiment 
questionnaire completed by the student subjects was analyzed 
to determine the subjects' perception of various 
experimental factors. 
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Conclusions 
The results of the study support four conclusions which 
merit further discussion. The conclusions are as follows: 
(1) As statutory penalties are increased, 
noncompliance to rules decreases given a low, constant 
probability of detection. 
(2) As statutory penalties are increased and the 
probability of audit increases, noncompliance to rules 
decreases. 
(3) Penalty magnitude levels do not appear to be 
significantly dependent upon the probability of audit, with 
regard to decreasing noncompliance. That is, an interaction 
between the factors apparently does not exist. 
(4) Subject groups with more incentive and opportunity 
to cheat than other subjects, recorded higher average 
noncompliance. 
In reality, the IRS audits approximately one percent of 
the individual tax returns [IRS, 1983]. Surveys have 
indicated that individual taxpayers perceive their 
probabilites of being audited are between two and twelve 
percent [Westat, 19801. Therefore, conclusions from this 
reseach offer realistic validity with regard to the audit 
variable. Also, the conclusion that an increase in 
statutory penalties is accompanied by a decrease in 
noncompliance is a validation of the general theory of 
deterrence. Congress relied on this theory in a portion of 
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the Tax Reform Act of 1986 [U.S. Congress, 19861. Several 
penalties were increased. Some of these included the 
penalty for failure to pay tax which increased from one-half 
to one percent per month, the negligence penalty which has 
been expanded to cover all taxes, and the fraud penalty 
which has been increased from 50 percent to 75 percent of 
the underpayment. 
The conclusions also support the part of the theory of 
deterrence that indicates that increasing the audit 
probability will be accompanied by a decrease in 
noncompliance. The IRS is attempting to follow this 
conclusion through enhanced detection capabilities. Their 
primary means to achieve higher detection probabilities is 
computer technology. Due to budget constraints this 
enhancement has been slow in coming. In comparing the two 
primary factors of this research, penalty magnitude and 
audit probability, the penalty factor has the quicker 
practical application. 
budget monies. 
It is not significantly dependent on 
The third conclusion suggests that penalty magnitudes 
can be increased for purposes of decreasing noncompliance to 
U.S. tax law without concern about increasing audit 
frequency. One factor appears not to be dependent on the 
other. Regardless of the probability of audit Congress 
should be able to achieve a decreased noncompliance rate by 
increasing the magnitude of penalties for noncompliance. 
The fourth conclusion is supported by the results of a 
study by Madeo, Schepanski, and Uecker [1987]. Higher 
income taxpayers have a greater opportunity to cheat on 
their taxes than low income taxpayers. These researchers 
used IRS TCMP data to discover that high income taxpayers 
report a lower portion of their actual income than low 
income taxpayers. The present study examined groups of 
subjects partitioned by relative score on Exam I. Subjects 
in the lowest scoring group had the greatest opportunity to 
cheat <the difference between the actual score and the 
maximum potential score>. This subject group reflected the 
greatest average amount of cheating. These findings imply 
that improvements in compliance might be brought about by a 
stronger scrutiny of the tax returns of high income 
taxpayers. Possibly, the IRS could shift budgetary dollars 
away from examinations of low income taxpayers to enhance 
examinations of high income taxpayers. This shift would 
increase the probability of detection of noncompliance. 
Limitations 
Behavioral experimental studies raise questions with 
regard to internal and external validity by their very 
nature. The methodology and design of Phase One of the 
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present study were such that the internal validity should be 
insured. In Phase Two the design was weakened due to the 
addition of the independent variable, audit frequency. An 
incomplete, but adequate, design was used. There were not 
sufficient class sections available to have a full factorial 
design due to administrative constraints. 
The greatest limitation of any laboratory 
experimentation in human behavior is external validity. 
Generalization of findings to other settings must be done 
with caution. Although care has been taken to design the 
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task to be analogous to the real world taxpayer decision, it 
is possible that students use a different frame for their 
decisions on exam scores than taxpayers use for income 
reporting. Also, studies have indicated that underreporting 
income was more likely among younger persons, those with 
more education, and students [Mason and Calvin, 1978, 1984]. 
The experimental results may be biased toward those groups. 
Another limitation of the study is that statutorily 
equal penalties may not be perceived to be personally 
equa 1 1 y severe. Confounding factors such as social stigma, 
wealth status, gender, and moral beliefs, may affect one's 
propensity to cheat. The present study did not positively 
eliminate the effects from any of these potential sources. 
Additionally, in each phase of the study three 
different teachers covered the tested class sections. It is 
possible a teacher bias existed in the collected data on 
comp 1 iance. Whether an instructor was liked <or disliked), 
perceived to be good <or bad), or perceived fair <or unfair) 
could have biased compliance to the set of rules and 
sanctions. Possibly, students who liked an instructor 
complied, in part, for the instructor. Conversely, it is 
possible that students may have had higher noncompliance, if 
the instructor was disliked. For some students, good or 
fair may have been the perception(s) that had biasing 
effects upon compliance. Whether, or not, a specific 
instructor was liked may not have been relevant. An 
instructor may have been perceived fair or good, but was 
disliked. Compliance may have been enhanced by the 
perceptions of fairness or goodness. Conversely, students 
perceiving their instructor<s> to be unfair, or bad, may 
have had a compulsion to cheat. These students may have 
felt disadvantaged. Cheating, or not following the rules, 
was a means to gain, or regain, perceived proper advantage 
in their classes. Also, during the semester<s> an 
instructor could have made accidental or causal remarks 
related to the self-grading process. It is unlikely that 
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this type of occurrence existed, but there is a possibility. 
Cheating may have been enhanced, or may have been curtailed 
due to the comments. The teacher factor was not directly 
examined or controlled in the study. The degree of 
significance of this effect upon compliance is unknown. 
Also, the possibilty exists that .a portion of the 
students used in this study did not take the task seriously. 
In the past, there has been a significantly high drop rate 
in introductory accounting courses. The high drop rate may 
be due in part to students who do not adequately apply 
themselves to the course subject. If a significant 
proportion of the students failed to take the task 
seriously, the data collected may be biased. No research 
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has established the degree to which taxpayers approach tax 
filing seriously. The extent to which this problem might 
inhibit external validity is indeterminable. 
A final limitation concerns an often discounted element 
of the general theory of deterrence, celerity of detection 
and penalty imposition [Teevan, 1976]. In the present study 
detection occurred quickly. Penalties, where applicable, 
were swiftly administered. In contrast, the IRS currently 
operates at a fairly slow pace. Some detection procedures 
can take up to eighteen months to implement [IRS, 1983]. 
Due to the many various appeals procedures available to 
taxpayers, penalty payments could occur at a time far 
removed from the noncompliance event. Celerity could, in 
part, account for the significant effects penalties and 
audit· frequencies had on noncompliance in the experiment. 
This factor could constrain external validity. 
Future Research 
The results of this study provide additional insights 
into the factors that affect overt noncompliance. Research 
indicates that increased magnitudes of penalty can lead to 
optimal levels of compliance. Therefore, administrative 
agencies such as the IRS may pressure Congress to modifr. 
current laws. Improved efficiency and increased equity in 
the federal tax system might result. 
The next step in compliance research is to identify the 
minimum penalty magnitudes that will result in compliance, 
or noncompliance, settling at acceptable or optimal levels. 
This is important due to the fact that it is possible that 
the minimum penalty is so great that society would rebel 
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against it. Therefore, other factors should be investigated 
further. For example, future research should address the 
optimal level of auditing necessary to bring about optimal 
compliance. 
Additionally, research should be conducted to explore 
the interaction between the penalty and audit factors. 
Although the present study did not uncover a significant 
relationship between these factors, the general theory of 
deterrence seems to indicate there is such an interactive 
relationship. Finally, studies should be conducted to 
investigate how the celerity factor fits into the general 
theory of deterrence. 
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EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 
ACCTG 2103 
1. A self-grading procedure will be used in this course to 
grade exams. 
2. Your course grade will be based solely upon examination 
scores. 
3. Exam days will follow traditional procedures: 
(a) Closed-book exams will be taken during regular 
class time. 
(b) Calculators may be used. Notes or other study 
aids are not permitted during the exam. 
(c) Upon completing the exam or expiration of time, 
the exam will be submitted to your monitor. 
(d) Any student suspected of cheating during the exam 
will be given a zero for exam score. If such student 
wishes to withdraw from the course, he/she will be 
given an "F". 
4. The very next class meeting, the exams will be 
returned. You will receive the following items: 
<a> Answer Key 
(b) Grading Instructions 
<c> Grade Report Form 
5. Using the answer key and following the grading 
instructions, you will complete the Grade Report Form. 
Be sure to follow directions carefully. Answer all 
questions. Fill in all blanks. Failure to follow 
directions may result in a penalty and a lower exam 
score. 
6. Only the completed Grade Report Form will be returned 
to your monitor. You will keep your exam, the answer 
key and other materials. The completed Grade Report 
Form will be due approximately one week after the exam 
day. The specific day, time, and place will be 
explained in the grading instructions. 
89 
Loss of Points 
1. Late Report: Failure to submit the Grade Report Form 
when due will result in a loss of 5% of the reported 
exam score daily for the first three days. One day is 
charged beginning with the due time. For example, if 
the due time is 10:30 AM, and the grade report form is 
submitted at 10:34 AM one day late is charged. Be sure 
your grade reports are submitted on time. Turn in your 
report early, if you want. 
The third day after the due date, an additional loss of 
points of 25% of the reported score will be charged, 
above the 5% daily charge. 
2. Report not turned in: If a student fails to submit a 
grade report form, a ~will be recorded for 
that exam. 
3. If a student does not take the examination at the 
regularly scheduled time, a ~will be recorded 
for that exam. 
See your instructor's syllabus for details and 
exceptions. 
4. KEEP YOUR EXAMS for review and to support your grading 
computations, if they are possibly checked. 
DO NOT LOSE OR MISPLACE YOUR EXAMS !!!!! !!! ! 
5. There may be different exam versions. Different answer 
keys, grading instructions, and grade report forms may 
be used. Do not use any materials of another student. 
Confusion, unnecessary questioning, and incorrect 
reporting may result. This could lead to a loss of 
points. 
During the semester all students will be treated 
equally as to exams, answer keys, grading instructions, 
and Grade Report Forms. 
Compliance Check 
1. During the semester a few students' Grade Report Forms 
will be randomly selected to check for grading errors 
and compliance with grading instructions. Names will 
be drawn from a hat. The monitor will make xerox 
copies of only those selected students' tests to 
confirm grading. 
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Approximately 12% to 24% of the Grade Report Forms will 
be checked on each exam. The precise number will be 
stated in your Grading Instructions for each 
self-graded test. 
2. If, by chance, your report form is randomly selected to 
be checked, you will be notified by mail to meet with 
the monitor. It is imperative that the monitor has 
your correct local address. If you move, be sure to 
notify the monitor. 
Time and place of the meeting will be stated in the 
notification letter. When you get the notification 
letter, return the enclosed confirmation card to the 
monitor's office immediately. 
3. At the meeting, bring your original exam. Checking 
your grading will be mandatory at the meeting. 
Do not lose your original exams! If you lose the 
original exam, it may result in a ~score for 
the portion checked. 
4. If negligent or fraudulent errors are discovered during 
the meeting, penalty points may be deducted from your 
actual test score as determined by the monitor. 
Specific penalties will be described in the Grading 
Instructions for each self-graded test. 
University policies on cheating will not apply to 
self-graded tests due to other penalties. 
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Improved Learning 
1. The grading procedure should result in an enhancement 
of learning. Previous semesters using similar methods 
have suggested that most students enjoyed grading their 
own exams. Students may learn more from their mistakes 
when grading their own. exams. 
2. If you have strong objections to the self-grading 
procedure, you may request that the monitor grade all 
your exams. To be excluded, you must inform the 
monitor immediately <today!). 
Your Examination Monitor: Rick Crosser, 107 
Business Bldg., 624-5115. 
****** DO NOT LOSE THIS DOCUMENT. ****** 
IT WILL BE USEFUL LATER IN THE SEMESTER. 
APPENDIX B 
GRADE REPORT FORM AND GRADE REPORT 
FORM INSTRUCTIONS 
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GRADE REPORT FORM 
Exam I I I 
Name ______________________________ ___ Student Number ________ _ 
Local Address 
---------------------
Telephone Number ______ _ 
Class Time ________ _ I n s t r uc tor----------------------------
Reminder: FILL IN ALL BLANKS! 
Carefully read both pages of the GRADE REPORT 
FORM INSTRUCTIONS. From the INSTRUCTIONS, 
answer the next two questions. 
What is the size of penalty #1, page 2 __________ ? 
The percentage of exams to be checked is _________ ? 
EXAM SCORING: 
Part I. <18 points> 
Questions 1- 9, points earned 
Part II. (15 points> 
Questions 10-14, points earned 
Part I I I. (9 points> 
Questions 15-17, points earned 
Part IV. (42 points) 
Questions 18-31' points earned 
Part V. <16 points> 
Questions 32-35, points earned 
EXAM SCORE: Add all of the lines above 
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I have reviewed this Grade Report Form and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief the information reported herein 
is true, correct, and complete. I understand that in the 
event of a possible check of this exam, if a difference is 
found between the score as reported here and the true score, 
penalties may be applied. 
<Your Signature) <Date) 
GRADE REPORT FORM INSTRUCTIONS 
ACCTG 2103- EXAM III 
********************************************************** 
* * 
* USE YOUR OWN GRADE REPORT FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS. * 
* USE OF ANOTHER STUDENT'S FORMS WILL CAUSE MISTAKES * 
* AND YOU WILL BE PENALIZED. <SEE PENALTY #1, PAGE 2. > * 
* REFER TO YOUR HANDOUT, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES. * 
* * 
********************************************************** 
********************************************************** 
* * 
* 1. Fill out the information section on the Grade * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 2. 
* 
* 3. 
* 
* 
* 
* 4. 
* 
* 
* 5. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Report Form. Failure to complete the entire* 
form will result in penal ties. <See Penalty #3, 
page 2 of this instruction sheet.) 
Use the answer key to grade your exam. 
Read your teacher's explanations carefully, 
even if you answered the question correctly. 
This will help you learn as you grade your test. 
Record your exam score on the Grade Report Form. 
Be sure to follow the directions carefully ! ! ! !! 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
When you have completed the Grade Report Form, * 
read the statement at the bottom. Sign your * 
name and write the date in the spaces provided. * 
Be sure to sign your Grade Report Form. Failure * 
to sign the form will result in penalties. * 
<See Penalty #3, page 2.> * 
* 
********************************************************** 
********************************************************** 
* * 
* TURN IN YOUR COMPLETED GRADE REPORT AT THE BEGINNING * 
* OF CLASS TIME, IN YOUR REGULAR CLASSROOM, ON * 
* WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6. LATE FORMS WILL BE * 
* PENALIZED. <See page 2 of EXAMINATION PROCEDURES> * 
* * 
********************************************************** 
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BE SURE TO FINISH READING THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE NEXT PAGE 
********************************************************** 
* * 
* 
* 
* #1. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* #2. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* #3. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* #4. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
PENALTIES 
* 
12 percent of EXAM III PAPERS WILL BE CHECKED 
FOR FOLLOWING GRADING INSTRUCTIONS. 
* 
* 
* 
<In your class, 12% x 39 = 4.68 = 5 exams>. * 
The exams will be chosen randomly, * 
< drawn from a hat ) prior to receipt of your * 
Grade Report Form. If your exam is chosen, * 
you will be contacted for an office visit. * 
* TWO TIMES the difference between the reported * 
score and true score will be deducted as a * 
penalty from the true score, if you are * 
discovered to have been careless or fraudulent* 
in following instructions. University policy* 
on cheating will not apply for self-graded * 
exams. 
IF MATH ERRORS ARE FOUND ON THE GRADE REPORT 
* 
* 
* 
* FORM, the math mistake will be corrected, and* 
the corrected score will be recorded. There * 
will be no penalty for math errors. Students* 
wil 1 be notified by mail at their local * 
address of any math errors on their grade * 
report form and of the corrected score. * 
* 
* IF THE GRADE REPORT FORM IS NOT PROPERLY AND * 
COMPLETELY PREPARED <including signature and * 
date), one <1> point will be deducted * 
for each omission and error. * 
* 
* FOR REPORTS SUBMITTED AFTER THE DUE DATE AND * 
TIME ABOVE, see numbers 1, 2, and 3 on page 2 * 
of the handout, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES. * 
* 
* 
********************************************************** 
********************************************************** 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
If you have questions or serious problems in 
grading your exam, contact RICK CROSSER, room 107, 
Business Bldg. Phone: 624-5115. Office Hours: 
Monday, Wednesday, Friday 12:10-2:30. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
********************************************************** 
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Grading Questionnaire 
Accounting 2103 
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Please answer the following questions about the self-grading 
procedure for exams. Darken the space on the answer sheet 
for the one answer which best describes your feelings. 
Your answers will be anonymous. Do not put your name on the 
answer sheet. 
Please use the following scale to answer the questions: 
<Except for Question 26) 
[ 1 ] Definitely Yes 
[ 2 ] Yes 
[ 3 ] Not applicable to me 
[ 4 ] No 
( 5 J Definitely No 
1. enjoyed grading my own exam. 
2. learned more from grading my own exam than I would 
have otherwise. 
3. The explanations on the answer key were beneficial in 
aiding me learn from my mistakes. 
4. I studied less for this course because I graded my 
own exams. 
5. It was very time consuming to grade my own exams. 
6. My effort level in complying with the grading 
instructions was consistent from one exam to the next. 
7. It was very hard to grade my own exams. 
8. The first exam was much harder to grade than 
the others. 
9. If I was unsure how to grade a particular question, 
gave myself the benefit of the doubt. 
10. bent the grading rules wher&·l thought my total 
exam score was too low. 
11. I would have had the same exam scores if the 
instructor had graded my exams. 
12. I would have had lower exam scores if the instructor 
had graded my exams. 
13. 1 would have had higher exam scores if the instructor 
had graded my exams. 
14. At the beginning of the semester, I expected at least 
one of my exams would be checked for grading accuracy. 
15. If my chance of being caught was almost zero, would 
not be concerned about the size of the possible 
penalty for cheating. 
16. The chance of having my exam checked made me more 
careful in following the grading instructions. 
17. If my chance of being caught is almost 100%, would 
not be concerned about the size of the possible 
penalty for cheating. 
18. I was very concerned about making a mistake in 
grading my exam. 
19. The larger-sized penalties caused me to refrain 
from cheating. 
20. If the penalty was zero, I felt safe to cheat. 
21. I was carefu 1 about grading my exams because of the 
University policy for academic dishonesty. 
22. 1 think the monitor was close to the day-to-day 
activities of my class. 
23. I felt a lot of extra stress from trying to follow 
the grading instructions. 
24. felt that the test questions were unfair. 
25. feel that letting students grade their own tests 
is unfair. 
26. The percentage of exams actually checked for the class 
as a whole was: 
[ 1 ] 
0% 
[ 2 ] 
1% 
[ 3 ] 
4% 
[ 4 ] 
10% 
[ 5 ] 
100% 
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TABLE X I I I 
POSTEXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE--
SUMMARY RESULTS 
Question 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Mean 
2.851 
3.018 
2.155 
4. 186 
3.924 
3.752 
4.038 
3.617 
3.012 
4.112 
2.057 
4.081 
3.899 
2.127 
2.791 
2.140 
3.635 
2.450 
2.553 
3. 119 
3.362 
3.229 
3.513 
2.892 
3.253 
3.044 
99 
APPENDIX D 
PLOT OF NONCOMPLIANCE BY CLASS SECTIONS 
100 
NONCOMP I 
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Figure 2. Plot of Noncompliance by Class Sections 
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